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U.S. DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
SECOND ANNUAL ASSESSMENT

OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

ADVISORY GROUP

For the Plan Period
December 1, 1994 through June 30, 1996
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) to
initiate a systematic study of case management practices in the federal
trial courts in order to reduce cost and delay in civil litigation. 1 The
CJRA required each district court, assisted by an advisory group appointed by the district's Chief Judge, to undertake a critical self-examination
pursuant to general CJRA guidelines and to craft a concrete plan of
action, tailored to local conditions and practices, to solve identified cost
and delay problems in civil dispositions. This "expense and delay
reduction plan" had "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases
on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and
2
ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."
In accordance with CJRA mandates, the Advisory Group for this
District submitted to the Court in 1993 an extensive Report 3 and a
proposed Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, which the
Court adopted, with virtually no change, effective December 1, 1993.4
The Advisory Group then undertook the first of the yearly evaluations
required by the Act 5 in order to determine the Plan's effectiveness in the
context of the District's evolving civil and criminal dockets. In June
1995, the Advisory Group issued its First Annual Assessment, covering

1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1995).
2. Id. § 471.
3. Report of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the Districtof North Dakota, 69 N.D.
L. REv. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Report].
4. The Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan for the District of North Dakota, 69 N.D.
L. REv. 860 (1993) [hereinafter Plan]. The Plan has 11 provisions. Each is reviewed in this assessment, which, along with the proposed second Plan amendment, the Reporter drafted for the Advisory
Group's review, discussion, revision, and adoption.
5. Each district court must "assess annually the condition of the court's civil and criminal dockets
with a view to determining appropriate additional actions that may be taken by the court to reduce cost
and delay in civil litigation and to improve the litigation management practices of the court." 28 U.S.C.
§ 475.
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the Plan period December 1, 1993 through November 30, 1994, and
recommended only minor refinements to the Plan. 6 The Court adopted
the Advisory Group's suggested First Amendment to the Plan, which
became effective June 30, 1995.7
This is the Advisory Group's second annual assessment of the Plan.
Picking up where the first annual assessment left off, this assessment
covers the Plan's second "year" from December 1, 1994 through June
30, 1996. Because of budgetary constraints, the Advisory Group was
unable to meet often enough to issue this assessment closer to the end of
the Plan's actual second year (i.e., November 30, 1995) and decided
instead to expand the scope of its coverage beyond a year in order to
deliver a more current report to the Court.8
Now, with two and a half years of CJRA experience to draw upon,
the Advisory Group is pleased to report that the Plan, and the practices
developed or expanded under its influence, have notably augmented the
Court's capacity to decide civil cases in a cost-efficient and timely
fashion. In particular, we can state with renewed conviction that firm
trial dates, set early in the pretrial stage, power the Plan as a whole. Like
a stone dropped in a pond, firm trial dates have had concentric circles of
positive impact on related aspects of the pretrial process, by inspiring a
new respect for pretrial schedules on counsel's part, assisting basic
compliance with the eighteen month trial and sixty-day motion benchmarks on the Court's part, encouraging increased trial consents before
the Magistrate Judges, and even facilitating early settlements.

6. First Annual Assessment of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group For the Period
December 1, 1993 through November 30, 1994, 71 N.D. L. REV. 897 (1995) [hereinafter FirstAnnual
Assessment]. As the Advisory Group stated:
[T]he Plan's first year has been a successful one and ... the District's case processing
capabilities have improved under its provisions. While the Plan's full impact may not be
evident for some time, there is little reason to make radical adjustments on its one year
anniversary in light of the positive gains made so far. Accordingly, the Advisory Group
unanimously reaffirms its commitment to the Plan and concludes that only minor refinements to the Plan are necessary at this time.
Id. at 900.
7. FirstAmendment of the District'sCivil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, 71 N.D. L.
REV. 905 (1995) [hereinafter FirstAmendment to the Plan].
8. A number of conclusions in this assessment derive from statistical reports compiled by the
Clerk's Office, and are on file there. The Advisory Group extends its appreciation to the Clerk of
Court and to those on his staff who collected this data. Very special thanks go to Deputy Clerk of
Court Sheila Beauchene for her invaluable assistance and expertise in acting as the recording
secretary and administrative backbone for the Advisory Group.
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As part of this re-evaluation of the Plan, the Advisory Group revisited two subjects that the first generation of the Group had specifically
reserved for re-examination: Rule 26(a)(1) (where we now recommend
change) and voluntary alternative dispute resolution (where we do not).
Rule 26 prompted the most vigorous discussion. After a close vote, and
with an acknowledgment that no clear consensus on the rule's ultimate
viability currently exists, the Advisory Group decided to recommend
retaining, for now, the new rule, implementing its controversial initial
disclosure provisions on more of a case-by-case basis (as the rule itself
encourages), and re-evaluating this District's experiences with the rule at
a later date. This recommendation is premised on the proper use of the
Rule 26(f) conference provision, which generally has not received
enough attention from the Bar, but is necessary to the successful functioning of the rule. The Advisory Group is hopeful that open-minded
reconsideration of, and good faith compliance with, the rule will result in
the efficiencies it was designed to provide.
What follows here is the Advisory Group's provision-by-provision
reassessment of the original and first amended plan with recommendations for a second amended plan revising provisions 2a, 2b, 2d, 2e, 3, 4,
and 10. Overall, this assessment of the Plan is a very positive one. While
the Plan revisions recommended are important-particularly the Rule
26(a)(1) recommendation-none is directed at changing the basic principles of civil case management embodied in the original Plan and its
first amendment.
Any changes to the Plan actually adopted by the Court in the wake
of this second assessment will follow in a separate Court order, a suggested draft of which will accompany this report to the Court. For a current
statement of the Plan in its entirety, the original Plan, the First Amendment to the Plan, and any Second Amendment to the Plan that the Court
adopts, should be consulted. As an order of the Court, the Plan should
be familiar to all District practitioners, who will be held to know and
abide by its provisions. The Plan "shall be read in conjunction with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of this District, and any
other applicable rules, orders, and procedures governing the practice and
9
administration of law in this Court."

9. Plan, supra note 4, at 862.
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REASSESSMENT OF THE PLAN'S PROVISIONS

1. Differentiated Case Management. The civil case classification
system instituted by the Plan (which differentiated between express
(Class One) and standard (Class Two) cases) has assisted the Court in
tracking cases for scheduling purposes and in helping to ensure that no
case, no matter how small, "falls between the cracks." This system
works particularly well for keeping the Court's eye on Class One cases,
which typically require little judicial management and which usually will
not go to trial.10
The Advisory Group again considered whether a third class should
be created for complex cases, but rejected the idea because of low case
volume in this category. Accordingly, the Advisory Group is satisfied
that the dual classification system works as originally designed and
recommends no changes to this Plan provision.
2. Early and Ongoing Control of the Pretrial Process,
2a. Firm Trial Dates Set Early at the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference. In its original Report to the Court, the Advisory Group predicted some of the key cost and timing advantages of setting firm trial (and
final pretrial conference) dates early in the action's life at the Rule 16(b)
Scheduling Conference:
Firm trial and final pretrial conference dates will help to keep the
entire pretrial schedule in place. Under the old scheduling system, the
case was "headless" and proceeded through the pretrial phase without a
target trial date to inspire efficiency and respect for discovery and other
deadlines. Now, with a firm trial date at the end of the pretrial line, both
the Court and counsel will have great reason to enforce the schedule as
set early in the case and to compress the time from filing to trial.
Setting firm pretrial conference dates to take place thirty or so days
before the trial itself will also promote greater efficiencies. Counsel
should not be forced to be ready for the final pretrial conference and trial,
only to have their case sit for a long time after the pretrial conference,
waiting for trial to take place. Thus, the firmness of the final pretrial
conference and trial dates and the close proximity of both events will
10. Plan, supra note 4, at 862-63 (defining Class One cases).
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preclude wasteful "false starts" (from preparation for the final pretrial
conference) and costly "re-starts" (for the re-preparation once a trial date
is eventually assigned). This eliminates the "hurry up and wait" concern
expressed in the bar survey.
[Flirm trial dates are [also] excellent settlement incentives. As the
inevitable reality of having to try a case approaches, it often pressures
counsel into hard thinking about whether to risk this option for the
client. Most often, they choose not to.11
These projections are soundly supported by this District's two and
one half years under the Plan. These years reconfirm, with the convincing clarity of actual experience, that setting firm trial and final pretrial
conference dates for each Class Two case is the key to civil case disposition efficiency.12 Put more graphically, firm trial dates drive the pretrial
process, whether in strengthening scheduling reliability, encouraging
deadline compliance, minimizing discovery abuses, maximizing pretrial
preparation efforts, or facilitating settlement. From the initial Rule 16(b)
conference, through the intermediate status conference (if held), through
the final pretrial and settlement conferences, through the start of trial, the
firm trial-date-set-early is the glue which holds this pretrial sequence
together, and whose strength is reinforced by the efficiency touch points
provided by the various judicial conferences along the route to trial.13
A look at the Court's civil docket for the period under review
reveals that only a few Class Two civil cases did not have firm trial dates.
One reason for the Court's success in this area is counsel's apparent
perception that trial dates, once set at the Rule 16(b) Conference, are in
fact "firm." While well over one-half of the motions for continuance
are granted, the total number of cases actually continued is relatively
small. And, as a general rule, anecdotal information revealed that
lawyers did not request continuances unless they had very good reason
to do so. Thus, pre-Plan continuances were often based on discovery
needs as they arose, not infrequently the result of missed deadlines or
other scheduling abuses. Post-Plan, given the Court's new resolve to
hold counsel to pretrial schedules capped in place with a firm trial date,

11. Report, supra note 3, at 781-82.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(B) (1995) (endorsing the setting early of firm trial dates and an 18
month period from filing to trial).
13. As Congress noted in defining the goals of the CJRA effort: "Evidence suggests that an
effective litigation management and cost and delay reduction program should incorporate several
interrelated principles, including ... regular communication between a judicial officer and attorneys
during the pretrial process ....
" Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(5)(C),
104 Stat. 5089, 5089 (1990).
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counsel most often based their requests on either substantial case concerns, such as joinder of new parties, where it made sense for the Court to
grant additional time in the name of fairness and ultimate efficiency, or
on unexpected developments that parties could not plan for, such as the
illness of experts, the instability of plaintiff's medical condition, and
family emergencies, where the Court had little choice but to grant
additional time. The main point is that inattentiveness to deadlines rarely
provided the impetus for continuance requests. Even if it had, the Court,
particularly with the pretrial scheduling structure solidly in place, would
have been reluctant to grant them.
Accordingly, the Advisory Group, once again, reaffirms its abiding
belief that the Court's early setting of firm trial dates is the foundation
of this Plan and praises the Court and counsel for embracing this important change. However, the Group does recommend that the Court keep
more detailed track of continuances so that the Group can more accurately assess the number of continuances requested and the reasons for
the requests. Thus, the Advisory Group requests that future reports to
the Group make note of all continuances, whether granted or denied. In
addition, the revised report should list the reason for the continuance
request and the length of time granted.
2b. Eighteen Month Benchmark for Trials. The First Annual
Assessment did not make any recommendations about the propriety of
the eighteen month (from filing to trial) benchmark given the natural
absence of information before the close of the first post-Plan eighteen
month cycle. More experience under this Plan provision, however, now
demonstrates its success: Few trials in this District start beyond the
eighteen month vintage point. As reported, almost all cases that need a
trial date have onel 4 and they are being heard within eighteen months-a
notable improvement for this District and one directly assisted by the
Court's early and firm selection of trial and final pretrial conference
dates. Worth reiterating is the rationale behind this improvement, from
the Advisory Group's original Report to the Court:
This new eighteen month lead time in setting trial dates-and setting
them firmly-should help alleviate some of the scheduling problems
resulting from Speedy Trial Act preemption by enabling the Court to

14. Typically, Class One (express track) cases do not receive trial dates because there is usually
no expectation of a trial.
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schedule the criminal trials around a pre-existing civil calendar of firm
trial dates (instead of vice versa). 15
Accordingly, the Court and counsel should be congratulated for their
efforts thus far to comply with the trial benchmark set by the Plan.
Questions did arise, however, about readjusting the benchmark. For
example, one concern surfaced about the increase of criminal filings for
the first half of 1996, a development which could adversely impact the
Court's ability to schedule and hear civil trials within eighteen months.
Another concern was dispositive motions made near the end of the
pretrial period-particularly of the summary judgment variety-which,
in a few recent cases, put tremendous pressure on the Court to act
quickly in deciding these motions in order to preserve the final pretrial
conference and trial dates within the eighteen month limit. If made too
late in the period, these motions put the Court in the uncomfortable
position of either having to move the trial date or to decide a key pretrial
motion under a tight deadline.
Despite these points, the Advisory Group concluded that the eighteen month period should not be lengthened. In the absence of compelling reasons to do so, extending the eighteen month period would violate
the CJRA's letter and spirit to cut cost and delay in civil litigation. If
anything, the pretrial period should be reduced, not expanded. To
relieve the dispositive motion crunch at the end of the pretrial period, the
Advisory Group recommends that counsel, to the extent feasible, should
plan to avoid heavy motion practice at this time. In particular, counsel
and the Court should be careful to set motion deadlines a minimum of
90-120 days before the final pretrial conference in order to allow
counsel sufficient response and reply time, and the Court, adequate
ruling time. This minimum should also be considered by the Court in
selecting the trial date and in approving the discovery deadlines proposed by counsel. And as to increased criminal filings, the Advisory
Group will abide the actual impact, if any, of those increases before
making any recommendations in this area.
Conversely, the Advisory Group thought it unwise to recommend
shortening the eighteen month benchmark. This decision is premised on
the acknowledgment that the benchmark is merely a target date. A client
is free to press for an earlier trial date, and consistent with justice and
thoroughness, the Court and counsel should do everything in their
15. Report, supra note 3, at 781.
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powers to dispose of cases as quickly and fairly as possible without using
the benchmark as a justification for procrastination in those cases which
require less time to prepare.1 6 Moreover, there are affirmative reasons
why reducing the benchmark period does not necessarily work to the
benefit of any litigation participant:
(1) In the last year and a half, though precise records were not
kept on this issue, the Court recollects that there were relatively few
requests for continuances. Their paucity suggests that counsel, overall,
are satisfied with the eighteen month "filing to trial" target and that this
time frame represents a good balance between sufficient trial preparation
time and efficient disposition time. Indeed, this benchmark is suggested
by the CJRA itself.17
(2) Too short a trial fuse could cramp counsel unfairly in discovery and trial preparation. This pressure, in turn, might encourage additional requests for continuances, upsetting the growing expectancy on
the Bar's part that trial dates, once set, are firm unless there are very
good reasons to change them. The Advisory Group felt any change that
would erode or work against firm trial dates-the heart of this District's
Plan-should be avoided.
In addition, too condensed a pretrial period might create
(3)
unnecessary tension between counsel, as well as between counsel and the
Court, and generate animosity or anxiety that could undermine the
constructive atmosphere necessary to initiate or successfully conclude
settlement discussions.
(4) Further, precisely because of the Court's settlement success, the
District has been able to make excellent use of juror time. There are few,
if any, last minute settlements on the courthouse steps due to the District's institutionalization of effective pretrial settlement procedures, so
that jurors, when called, almost always serve. This permits them to plan
for their absences with increased predictability. Thus, respect for those
citizens who give of their time for juror service offers yet another reason
for not tampering with the current benchmark.

16. In fact, approximately 30% of the cases in the time period under review in this second
assessment were set for trial in less than 18 months.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(B) (1995) (endorsing an 18-month period from filing to trial and
the early setting of firm trial dates).
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Accordingly, the Advisory Group concluded that it is not worth
jeopardizing this Court's excellent track record of firm trial dates,
pretrial settlements, or efficient juror service by shaving a month or two
off the eighteen month, CJRA-sanctioned benchmark. The Group urges
counsel to explain to clients who resist the benchmark why eighteen
months might be an acceptable span for trial preparation and settlement
discussions. As one Group member put it, clients who initially object to
the eighteen month "delay" but who are given a better understanding
of "what happens along the way" usually come to accept the necessity
for it. Otherwise, the Group recommends no changes to this Plan provision at this time, except to note its recommendations for scheduling dispositive motions earlier in the pretrial period.
2c. The Intermediate Status Conference. Last year, in the First
Amendment to the Plan, the Court, upon advice of the Advisory Group,
eliminated the mandatory nature of the Intermediate Status Conference
as envisioned by the original Plan.1 8 This change is working well. The
Intermediate Conference, generally held by telephone, is now convened
at counsel's request and takes place in about one half of the civil cases in
this District. The Conference essentially serves three main purposes, as
the Plan emphasizes:
(1) to define or refine issues for trial, (2) to explore (rather than to
impose) possible limits on the number and type of witnesses, particularly experts, and (3) to explore settlement prospects or revisit ADR
options. This conference will give the Court an opportunity to monitor
counsels' compliance with the discovery/scheduling plan and make
necessary "midstream" adjustments without disturbing the final pretrial
conference and trial dates. 19
Counsel seem to be asking for this conference in appropriate cases
so that the device is neither over nor under utilized. Similarly, it appears
that the Court's time is maximized by this change because its involvement is now limited to those cases which really require judicial guidance.
Accordingly, the Advisory Group is satisfied that last year's Plan revision, making the Intermediate Status Conference optional with the
parties, works as intended and recommends no further changes to this
Plan provision.

18. First Amendment to the Plan, supra note 7, at 907. See also FirstAnnual Assessment, supra
note 6, at 901-02 (recommending elimination of the conference's mandatory nature).
19. Plan, supra note 4, at 864.
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2d. Joint Jury Instructions. As we noted in our Report, "Much
court time could be saved if the parties presented the Court with a single
set of Uury] instructions, with [any] disagreements briefed and presented
to the Court for decision."20 The judges of the District Court agreed,
and, as part of the original Plan, required revision of then-Local Rule
8(G) to reflect this change. That Rule, adopted January 23, 1995 as new
Local Rule 47.1CV(F), now reads:
At least five days prior to the commencement of all jury trials, and after
sincere attempts by counsel to resolve any disagreements about the
instructions to be given, a jointly prepared single set of requested
instructions shall be presented to the court and served upon each adverse
party. The court may receive additional requests relating to questions
arising during the trial at any time prior to the argument. All requests
for instructions shall be plainly marked with the number of the case,
shall designate the party submitting the same, and each requested
instruction shall be numbered and written on a separate page, together
with a citation of authorities supporting the proposition of law stated in
the instruction. All disagreements about the instructions shall be briefed
and presented to the court at least five days before the start of the trial.
The Advisory Group has reprinted the text of this Local Rule
provision in full to reemphasize its significance in light of its frequent
breach by counsel in this District. The Rule requires that, at least five (5)
days before trial starts, counsel submit to the Court a jointly-prepared set
of agreed-upon jury instructions, along with any separate proposed
instructions where counsel could not agree to a joint version. These
separate instructions must be accompanied by briefs supporting each
party's version. Counsel are required to make "sincere attempts . . . to
resolve any disagreements" before submitting the joint instructions in
order to narrow the nature and number of disputed instructions.
These are important requirements, of great consequence to the
Court, and ultimately, to the case and client. The Court is usually in no
position-and should not be put in the position-to judge whether small
differences between sets of instructions are vital or inconsequential to
counsel or their clients. In addition, it may take the Court many staff
hours to even spot those differences, particularly if they are minor word
variations (which may or may not signify major substantive variations).

20. Report, supra note 3, at 784.
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Counsel, not the Court, should be making those initial wording determinations, at the very least, in the best interests of their clients. The responsibility of ironing out reconcilable differences and presenting irreconcilable ones, with supporting arguments, to the Court belongs to counsel.
The Local Rule requires this, and the Advisory Group urges counsel to
improve compliance with its strictures.
The Advisory Group also notes that the joint instruction requirement-including mention of a joint verdict form as well-is part of the
magistrate judges' final pretrial conference order. It reads, in pertinent
part: "In jury cases, an agreed upon set of jury instructions and verdict
form shall be submitted to the court seven [calendar or five working]
days prior to trial .... A party requesting an instruction which cannot be
agreed to should submit that instruction, along with a statement of
authority to the court." Given the importance of the verdict form, the
Advisory Group also recommends, consistent with the Court's final
pretrial conference order, that Local Rule 47.1CV(F) be amended to
require joint discussion and presentation of the verdict form as well as
the jury instructions.
2e. Sixty-Day Benchmark for Motions, Bench Trials, and Bankruptcy Appeals. The Court's Plan, as amended last year, provides a sixty-day
benchmark for decisions on motions, bench trials, and bankruptcy
appeals. 2 1 On the whole, the Court seems to be coming fairly close to
meeting the target. The Advisory Group, in assessing the Court's degree
of compliance, received varying levels of information from the judges.
Those with the most complete and current information reported a few
motion rulings beyond the benchmark. Most of those rulings were
deferred for special or sound reasons, and were usually made before the
next report cycle. In addition, some of the motions appearing on the
reports were from cases that were not assigned trial dates - for example,
in a few instances, rulings on pending social security appeals were
deferred so that the Court could immediately consider motions in cases
approaching trial.
In any event, the Advisory Group concluded, for the time being,
that the sixty-day benchmark is probably appropriate, even though each
judge will not always be able to meet it, primarily due to the fact that
cases with impending trial dates are the priorities for rulings. In attempting to reassess the validity of the sixty-day time frame, the Group found
21. FirstAmendment to the Plan,supra note 7, at 907.
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that it did not have the information necessary to make an accurate
assessment of whether it is realistic or overly optimistic. Accordingly,
the Group respectfully requests that the Clerk's Office prepare a revised
motions status report that will better assist the Group in this endeavor, to
be given to the Group sufficiently in advance of any CJRA meetings.
That report would be most helpful (1) if uniform in format, the periods
covered, and the information conveyed and (2) if reasons for nondecision could be provided. For efficiency's sake, the Clerk's Office
has agreed to explore producing a centralized, computer-generated
report that each judge could review and annotate on the last day of every
second month. This would eliminate the necessity of having each judge
prepare reports and would help capture current commentary on the
reasons for non-decision while that information is still fresh and easily
available.
3. Pretrial Monitoring of Complex Cases through DiscoveryCase Management Conferences. In the First Annual Assessment, the
Advisory Group encouraged-and the Court voiced commitment
to-more active case management by the district judges in complex
cases.22 While there have not been many cases in this District requiring
this involvement, the Advisory Group nonetheless strongly renews its
encouragement should those cases arise, and concomitantly asks the Bar
to inform the Court of cases which require or could benefit from the
active involvement of the Article III judges. Otherwise, the Advisory
Group recommends no changes to this Plan provision.
Court-Appointed Experts and Science and Technology in the
Courtroom. The Advisory Group continued to be troubled by the
perplexing problem of scientific evidence in the courtroom. The Group
discussed a range of options to assist the Court, including the creation of
an expert bank (that judges could draw upon for advice on a consultant
basis at the parties' expense), judicial tutorials agreed upon by the Court
and the parties, increased congressional funding for court-appointed

experts, and use of the Federal Judicial Center's REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE. As the Reference Manual explains, the ability of
litigants to receive a fair, timely, and reasonably priced trial is endangered when complex issues of science and technology overrun the
courtroom:

22. FirstAnnual Assessment, supra note 6, at 902.
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The purpose of this manual is to assist judges in managing expert
evidence, primarily in cases involving issues of science or technology.
Such issues may rise across the entire spectrum of litigation .... The
context in which they arise varies widely, but generally they share one
characteristic: They challenge the ability of judges and juries to comprehend the issue-and the evidence-and to deal with them in informed and
effective ways. As a result, they tend to complicate the litigation, increase expense and delay, and jeopardize the quality of judicial and jury
decision making.
'.. No longer can judges and jurors rely on their common sense
and experience in evaluating the testimony of many experts .... The
challenge the justice system faces is to adapt its process to enable the
participants to deal with this kind of evidence fairly and efficiently and to
23
render informed decisions.
The Reference Manual, however, does more than identify the
problems in this area. It attempts to provide both general and specific
guidance to judges facing difficult science and technology questions.
The Manual has three basic parts. The first is an overview, and discusses
the management of expert evidence from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure perspective as well as the evidentiary "framework for considering challenges to expert evidence" from the Federal Rules of Evidence
perspective. 24 Next are seven reference guides for expert testimony in
the areas of epidemiology, toxicology, survey research, forensic analysis
of DNA, statistical inference, multiple regression analysis, and estimation
of economic loss. 2 5 The last part concerns use of court-appointed
experts and special masters.26
Given this helpful repository of information, the Advisory Group
encourages the Court's review and use of the Reference Manual, when
appropriate, but otherwise recommends no changes to this Plan provision
at this time. The Group plans to resume discussion of this topic, particularly the expert bank concept, as part of its deliberations for the Third
Annual Assessment.
4. Voluntary Information Exchange and Cooperative Discovery
Devices. The Advisory Group's most provocative and extended
discussion revolved around Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26's early
23.

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON ScmNFic EvIDENE 1 (1994).

24. Id. at 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.at 4.
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disclosure provisions, an area the original Group reserved for further
discussion. 27 As its Report stated:
The Advisory Group's lengthy discussion about the proposed amendment
of Rule 26, which would require voluntary disclosure of certain basic
case information, ended inconclusively. While the Group supported the
basic spirit of the proposed rule, it was reluctant to wholeheartedly
embrace, at this time, the many changes it proposes without further
study.... The Advisory Group thought it best to defer decision about
the proposed rule pending its adoption and actual experience under the
rule in order to permit a more informed decision about this subject, if
appropriate, at a later stage in the Advisory Group's life. 28
The new Rule 26, eventually adopted on December 1, 1993, provides an escape hatch from its early disclosure requirements, with an
"opt-out" provision written right into the rule. 29 This District did not
opt out across the board, but, by local rule, selectively exempted Class
One cases, pro se prisoner petitions, and any other cases approved by the
Court upon the parties' stipulation. 30 Thus, as it now stands, the Court
has endorsed a balanced and pragmatic approach to the new provisions
which permits the Court and the parties some latitude in applying them:
While all Class Two cases in this District are subject to the early disclosure requirements, the Court may ultimately decide to excuse the parties
from any or all of their strictures by court-approved stipulation.
Given the general consternation surrounding early. disclosure, the
Advisory Group vigorously debated the subject, keeping in collective
mind the CJRA's emphasis on innovation and experimentation in the
name of reducing cost and delay in civil cases. As the Chief Judge of
this District put it at one Advisory Group meeting, the Bench and Bar
now face the serious problem of "pricing" potential litigants "out of

27. The Advisory Group limited its discussion of the rule to the initial disclosure and early conference provisions in Rule 26(a)(1) and 26(0, respectively. The Group plans to examine other Rule
26 sections as part of the Third Annual Assessment.
28. Report, supranote 3, at 791.
29. Ft. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) begins with the phrase "Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or
directed by order or local rule."
30. See D.N.D. LocAL R. 26.1, exempting Class One cases and pro se prisoner petitions 'from the
requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1) unless the court orders those requirements imposed in a
particular case." The Local Rule further states that "[aill stipulations amending or exempting the
requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 must be approved by the court." See also Standing Order of the
District Court (D.N.D. Jan. 20, 1994) (applying to all cases filed after December 1, 1993); Plan, supra
note 4, at 862-63 (defining Class One cases). Note, as well, that the Court's adoption of the new Rule
26 required revising the Plan, which itself had required less disclosure than Rule 26(a). See First
Amendment to the Plan, supranote 7, at 907.
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judicial resolution," and expressly requested the Group to consider ways
to make discovery easier and less expensive.
In this spirit, and after lengthy discussion and reconsideration of
both the Group's majority and minority perspectives that spanned
several meetings and a mail ballot, the Advisory Group, focusing solely
on the initial disclosure and conference provisions of Rule 26(a)(1) and
(f), respectively, decided by a six to five (6 to 5) vote to recommend to
the Court:
Implement[ing Rule 26] on a somewhat more case-by-case basis; [with]
parties permitted to define the scope of "voluntary disclosure" and of
traditional discovery. This would take place in the Rule 26(f) conference.31

The Advisory Group reached this conclusion, in good part, because it
was not convinced that the Bar has fully explored the requirements or
the advantages of Rule 26(a)(1) and (f). Indeed, the Group's recommendation to implement the initial disclosure provisions on "a somewhat more case-by-case basis" requires no changes to the existing rules
of this District, which, as noted above, already give the parties and the
Court, by stipulation, latitude in using Rule 26(a)(1) in a way which will
facilitate discovery in any particular case. Instead, at this juncture, as
explained below, the most immediate change should come in the way
Rule 26(a)(1) and (f) are practiced under the existing rules, in conjunction with a clarification of the Court's expectations in this newly developing area.
The Advisory Group is well aware that the Court and Bar have only
limited experience with practice under the rule (which is not yet three

31. Minutes of the CJRA Advisory Panel Meeting 10 (April 19, 1996) (on file with the Clerk of
Court). Because of the importance of this issue, all Advisory Group members were given an opportunity to vote and comment, whether present or absent when the vote was taken at the April 19, 1996
Advisory Group meeting. Each member chose between three options:
1: Recommend that the court continue to implement Rule 26 as is.... 2: Implement
[Rule 26] on a somewhat more case-by-case basis; parties permitted to define the scope
of "voluntary disclosure" and of traditional discovery. This would take place in the Rule
26(f) conference .... [and] 3: Opt out entirely of the requirements of Rule 26.
Id. At the April 19th meeting, no votes were cast for option 1,four votes were cast for option 2, and
three votes were cast for option 3. Id. The Chair, by mail ballot, then presented the issue to absent
members in an explanatory letter, accompanied by a draft of the minutes and a check-off ballot of the
three options with space for written comments. Letter from the Honorable Karen K. Klein, U.S.
Magistrate Judge. U.S. District Court, District of North Dakota, to CJRA Advisory Group Members
(May 24, 1996) (on file with Clerk of Court) [hereinafter Letter from the Honorable Karen K. Klein].
Two absentees voted for option 2 and two voted for option 3. The final vote tally was six for option 2
and five for option 3.
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years old) and that no clear consensus regarding the merits of Rule
26(a)(1) has emerged. In light of these points, the Group recommends
that continuing experience with the rule, to the extent court resources
permit, should be monitored and ultimately evaluated in a reconsideration of the current rule. However, until this reassessment is made, the
Group majority recommends retaining Rule 26(a)(1) while encouraging
both the Court and counsel to take new or renewed advantage of the
flexibility it-in conjunction with the District's local rule-expressly
provides to judges and lawyers in designing, approving, and executing
reasonable discovery plans.
Just what are the advantages of the new disclosure provisions? What
latitude do they provide? How can they work to help counsel and the
Court try cases with greater efficiency? And what will the Advisory
Group's Rule 26(a)(1) recommendation mean for counsel and the
Court, on a practical level, if the Court should adopt it? These questions
are best answered by examining the basic requirements of Rules 26(a)(1)
and (f), their intended benefits, and the Advisory Group's recommended
refinements to the Court's Rule 16(b) scheduling order and sample
scheduling/discovery plan, which, if adopted, will hopefully facilitate
optimal use of the early disclosure provisions, on a case-by-case basis, by
clarifying their meaning, operation, and flexibility.
The Basic Requirements of Rule 26(a)(1) and (f). As background
to understanding the benefits of early disclosure, the Advisory Group
thought it might help to provide an outline-in no way a substitute for a
close reading of the rule itself or any pertinent case law or commentary-of the basic components of Rule 26 (a)(1) and (f):
1. The Four Categories of Initial Disclosures: Potential Witnesses,
Documentary and Tangible Evidence, Damages, and Insurance.
"Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local
rule," and without waiting for formal discovery requests, the parties shall
exchange four types of information: (A) the identification of. witnesses
"likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the
information; (B) a copy or a description by category and location of all
documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession,
custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings;" (C) damages computation(s), with
non-privileged, non-protected supporting materials available for inspection and copying; and (D) any insurance policies that may cover, in
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Note the provi-

The Advisory Committee notes explain the reasons behind this
"pre-discovery exchange of core information" and, consistent with
CJRA imperatives, call for application of the rule to minimize discovery
costs and delays:
As the functional equivalent of court-ordered interrogatories, this paragraph requires early disclosure, without
need for any request, of four types of information that have
been customarily secured early in litigation through formal
discovery.
A major purpose of the revision is to accelerate the
exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate
the paper work involved in requesting such information, and
the rule should be applied in a manner to achieve those
objectives. 3 3
The parties are free to use "traditional discovery methods to obtain
further information regarding" initial disclosures, but-except when
authorized by rule, order, or agreement of the parties-they may not
begin formal discovery "until the parties have met and conferred as
required by subdivision (f)."34 Again, the stated exception encourages
flexibility.
2. When Initial Disclosures Shall Be Made. "Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court," the initial disclosures "shall be made at
or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f)."
Rule 26(a)(1). The exception once again encourages case-by-case
consideration of the rule.

32. Note also the Rule 26(a)(1) requirement that "[a] party shall make its initial disclosures based
on the information then reasonably available to it and is not excused from making its disclosures
because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency
of another party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures." Rule 26(e) also
imposes a duty to supplement Rule 26(a) disclosures.
33. Advisory Committee Notes to the Amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 146
F.RD. 627, 628, 629 (1993) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Notes]. For overviews of Rule 26(a)(1)
and (f), respectively, see generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, AND RIcHARD L.
MARcus, FEDaAL PRAcrtcE AND PocnuRE §§ 2053, 2051.1 (1994).
34. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 33, at 628, 640, see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
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3. The Rule 26(f) Conference: To Discuss Claims, Defenses and
Settlement, Initial Disclosure Arrangements, and a Discovery Plan.
"Except in actions exempted by local rule or when otherwise ordered,"
the parties, at this Rule 26(f) meeting, must do three things: "[A] discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case, [B] make or
arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1), and [C]
develop a proposed discovery plan." Rule 26(0. Again, the potential
for case-specific latitude is stated in the rule.
4. The Discovery Plan. The proposed discovery plan "shall indicate the parties' views and proposals" about four items: [A] any
changes concerning the "timing, form, or requirement" for the initial
disclosures, including a statement about when they "were made or will
be made," [B] the subjects of discovery, when discovery should be concluded, and whether it should be conducted by issues or in phases, [C]
any changes to discovery limitations imposed by these or local rules and
any other limitations that should be imposed, and [D] the need for
protective or other court orders concerning discovery and the pretrial
schedule. Rule 26(f(l)-(4). This provision is an explicit invitation to
counsel and the Court to tailor discovery to the particular case at hand.
5. Other 26(f) Conference Requirements: Attendance, Good Faith,
and Written Report. Rule 26(f) holds counsel "jointly responsible" [A]
for arranging and attending the conference, [B] "for attempting in good
faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and [C] for submitting to
the court within 10 days after the meeting a written report outlining the
plan." In this District, the Court requires filing of the plan only, not the
report.
The Advantages and Intended Benefits of InitialDisclosure. As the
close Advisory Group vote demonstrates, a notable number of members
chose to opt out of Rule 26 entirely, arguing that initial disclosure saved
neither time nor money, but in fact created delay and extra expense. In
particular, they emphasized that Rule 26(a)(1) was an unnecessary step
which created an additional layer, slowing down discovery and postponing the inevitable exchange of traditional discovery requests, which
ultimately get at the same information anyway. In addition, untrustworthy or uncooperative adversaries undermine the informal exchange by
hiding or withholding pertinent information, so that the process unfairly
becomes a "one way street." Moreover, counsel can lose control over
their cases and are forced to make predictions of relevance that may
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benefit the adversary, particularly if counsel feel compelled to turn over
damaging information in the absence of formal requests. Clients are
also uncomfortable with their lawyers "voluntarily" making harmful
admissions. While Rule 26(a)(1) may work best with cooperative adversaries, it is precisely in this situation that the rule is unnecessary. At least
one Advisory Group member has advised clients to avoid federal court
because of the requirement. 35
These actual and potential negatives, however, have counters and
should be seen in the context of the unique benefits early disclosure
offers-benefits specifically designed to reduce cost and delay in the
discovery process. The Advisory Group, in voting to retain Rule
26(a)(1), hopes to give the rule more time to manifest these advantages
in a manner that stresses the rule's flexibility and strengths in a more
case-by-case approach. This is especially warranted in light of the fact
that the rule as written may not be receiving its intended application in
this District. As the outline above demonstrates, a necessary predicate to
its successful operation is an earnest Rule 26(f) conference, and the
Advisory Group had reason to believe, from its discussions, that this rule
provision has not always been followed. And, as the Advisory Group
Chair observed:
[C]ounsel seem to be ignoring the requirement of Rule 26(f) that counsel
have a conference (face to face or at least by telephone, not by fax) to
define the scope of the disclosures they will make. The rule contemplates that counsel will let each other know what they are looking for
and then agree how much of it will be done "voluntarily" through Rule
26(a)(1) and how much of it will proceed through traditional discovery
requests. Counsel seem not to realize that they have this flexibility and
are spending their efforts instead in resisting the concept of disclosures as
"mandatory." The Rule 26(f) conference is contemplated as part of the
planning of the discovery schedule which takes place ...before the
scheduling/ discovery conference. 36
The Advisory Committee Notes confirm this notion of the 26(f) conference as a time for counsel-aided by the advantages of live exchange-to get beyond the paper allegations and to take responsibility

35. See also 146 FR.D. 507, 507 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting statement, joined by Thomas, J.,
and joined in relevant part by Souter, J.)(disagreeing with the Supreme Court's adoption of amendments to Rule 26 and noting that "the discovery proposal will increase litigation costs, burden the district courts, and, perhaps worst of all, introduce into the trial process an element that is contrary to the
nature of our adversary system").
36. Letter from the Honorable Karen K. Klein, supra note 31.
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for planning a mutually acceptable discovery program that will help
facilitate a fair and efficient resolution of the action:
[I]t is desirable that the parties' proposals regarding discovery be
developed through a process where they meet in person, informally
explore the nature and basis of the issues, and discuss how discovery can
37
be conducted most efficiently and economically.
Thus, an earnest effort to comply with Rule 26(f) requires both a
substantive discussion about claims, defenses, and relevant issues as well
as the more procedural discussion about dates, deadlines, and discovery
devices. Good faith is essential to these discussions. It is expressly
required by the rule when counsel discuss the discovery plan, and, the
Advisory Group believes, it is implicitly required for the other aspects of
Rule 26(a)(1) and (f) as well.
Thus, the Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosure provisions, when linked to
a good faith Rule 26(f) conference and interpreted in light of their
intended flexibility, not only seem viable innovations, but powerful ones.
There are a number of important advantages which flow from their
intended use and work against the negatives noted above:
(1) Early informal disclosure can provide a head start on, or "jump
start" to, the traditional discovery process. By requiring counsel to meet
near the action's inception and to talk as earnestly as possible, person to
person, about what information both counsel really seek and why they
seek it, the rule eliminates the immediate need for technical paper
discovery requests and speeds the exchange of core information that
might otherwise take weeks or months to extract under more formal
discovery methods. In short, by informally front-loading the discovery
process, the rule envisions that key information, that both sides would
request anyway, can be unearthed more quickly and effortlessly.
(2) Requiring good faith discussion about the substantive contours
of discovery starts counsel, early on, down the road of defining and
refining the factual and legal issues to be explored during the pretrial
and trial stages. This facilitates early case clarification and will hopefully
help to eliminate or at least to minimize unnecessary or overly broad
discovery requests once formal discovery begins. Indeed, the rule
envisions that the 26(f) conference will assist counsel in sharpening
discovery issues and requests, including those concerning the Rule
37. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 33, at 642 (emphasis added).
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26(a)(1) initial disclosures, which should be tailored, by counsel, to the
specific evidentiary needs of the individual case. The Advisory Committee notes explain this very practical, common sense bent of the rule:
Although paragraphs [26(a)](1)(A) and(l)(B) by their terms refer to the
factual disputes defined in the pleadings, the rule contemplates that these
issues would be informally refined and clarified during the meeting of the
parties under subdivision (f) and that the disclosure obligations would be
adjusted in light of these discussions. The disclosure requirements
should, in short, be applied with common sense in light of the principles of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 1, keeping in mind the salutary
purposes that the rule is intended to accomplish. The litigants should
not indulge in gamesmanship with respect to the disclosure obligations .38
(3) Thus, taken in the spirit intended, the 26(f) discussions can
significantly alter the discovery process, making it much more focused
from its inception, and much more a product of mutual negotiation than
unilateral inquisition. In effect, the "meet and confer" requirement of
Rule 26(f) can work to set a more positive and civil tone for litigation
relationships, with its emphasis on exploration rather than obfuscation,
and cooperation rather than confrontation. In this way, Rule 26(a)(1)
resists the more rigid and undesirable side of the adversarial model
which can lead to obstruction and delay and instead reinforces the side
which prizes adversaries who cooperate without compromising their
client's best interest. This is entirely consistent with CJRA litigation
management principles, which expressly endorse "cost-effective discovery through voluntary exchange of information among litigants and
their attorneys through the use of cooperative discovery devices." 3 9
(4) At the heart of the initial disclosure provisions is good faith-a
professional obligation that transcends this context, and one which the
CJRA doubtless relies upon in its cornerstone notion that courts, lawyers,
and clients alike share responsibility for solving the problems of cost and
delay in civil litigation. 40 And "good faith" is counsel's recourse when
an adversary will not cooperate-at or before the Rule 16(b) conference,
the Court should be informed of lapses in good faith and measures
should be taken, where appropriate, to ensure compliance with the
requirement.
38. Id. at 631.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (1995).
40. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(2)-(3), 104 Stat. 5089,5089

(1990).
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Unfortunately, counsel who bury documents or withhold information plague the judicial system no matter'how discovery is done, whether
with or without traditional document requests. But discarding an otherwise thoughtful discovery rule because of those who violate it by
non-cooperation sends the wrong message. Instead, the Court should
require compliance with its strictures until they become the norm and the
four-category exchange required by Rule 26(a)(1) becomes as automatic as it was intended to be, subject to any restrictions the Court approves
for particular cases.
(5) And, under any discovery system, either formal or informal,
counsel must make difficult calls about relevance and about turning over
harmful, but responsive documents. As two commentators observe:
Another criticism of the initial disclosure requirement is that it places
lawyers in an awkward conflict by forcing them to reverse roles from
adversary to abettor. The lawyer to the disclosing party now must abet
the opposing parties by insisting that her client disclose information that
will be helpful to them or risk later preclusion of the evidence and other
sanctions. . . .This criticism may overstate the impact of required
disclosures. The rule fully preserves a party's right to withhold privileged matter or work product, subject to the foundation-laying requirement of Rule 26(b)(5). In making initial disclosure, lawyers arguably do
little more than they already must in many cases when their clients are
served with broad interrogatories and document production requests tied
generally to the allegations of a pleading. They may have to guess at
the opposing party's legal theories in order to determine what materials
fall within the rule's relevancy standard, but in a notice pleading system
they must do the same in framing answers and replies. 41
Thus, not only is speculating about relevance an old problem, but the
new Rule 26 actually has a built-in mechanism for alleviating it: The
26(f) conference now provides official impetus and opportunity for
clarifying any ambiguities. Questions of relevance can be explored during the 26(f) conversation, so that the adversary, and not the information
proponent, must define what relevance means to him or her, along with
the particular types of information and documents sought. This, in good
measure, will relieve counsel of guessing at the adversary's idea of
relevance, and in fact, will do more to advance mutual understanding of

41. GENE R. SHREvE & PETER RAvEN-HANsEN, UNDERsTANiNG CIVIL PROCEDURE 310-11 (2d ed.

1994) (footnote omitted).
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the case than might otherwise have happened, especially at this early a
stage in the action's life.
(6) In this District, the Rule 26(f) conference, at least in form if not
in name and extent, should be no stranger to the Bar. Counsel in Class
Two cases are already required to meet and confer, at least fourteen days
in advance of the Rule 16(b) conference with the Court, in order to
jointly prepare a scheduling/discovery plan, which must include a list of
discovery issues as well as verification that counsel have discussed, both
between themselves and with their clients, ADR options. Rule 26(f)
expands this practice by requiring counsel, very pointedly, as described
above, to do more on a substantive level-they must "discuss the nature
and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt
settlement or resolution of the case."
(7) Further, the Rule 26(f) conference is a natural predecessor to
the Rule 16(b) conference and the two smoothly segue into each other:
Designing a workable, realistic discovery schedule can best be done
when counsel have some idea about the nature of the information
sought, the witnesses to be called, the issues that may be tried, and the
damages requested. In this way, the Rule 26(f) conference inspires-and
requires-counsel to have as clear a grasp as possible of their cases from
the start, which will make for a more productive Rule 16(b) conference
and aid in the efficient conduct of the action as a whole.
(8) All of this, of course, is done without waiving traditional
discovery avenues. Moreover, the rule provides tremendous flexibility to
counsel in designing their proposed discovery program, both in its
formal and informal aspects. Subject to court approval, counsel may
decide what information should be exchanged formally and informally
by proposing changes to the "timing," "form," or even the "requirement for disclosures" under Rule 26(a) 4 2 and may decide when and
whether discovery should proceed in phases or by issues or by both
methods.43 And as noted, Rule 26(a)(1) even allows counsel to stipulate
out of the initial disclosures listed. The Advisory Committee Notes to
Rule 26(a)(1) confirm the rule's inherent flexibility and sensitivity to
circumstance:
By order the court may eliminate or modify the disclosure requirements
in a particular case, and similarly the parties, unless precluded by order or
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2).
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local rule, can stipulate to elimination or modification of the requirements for that case. The disclosure obligationsspecified in paragraph(1)
will not be appropriatefor all cases, and it is expected that changes in
these obligations will be.made by the court or partieswhen the circumstances warrant.44
Case-by-Case Implementation. In this context, it is difficult to
categorize the initial disclosure provisions as either "mandatory" or
"voluntary" in the sense that the parties-under Rule 26 and this
District's Local Rule adopting it-are free to exchange the necessary
information, essentially as they see fit, as long as they stand ready to
justify the methods and time frame chosen and the Court agrees that the
parties have paid proper respect to Rule 26(a)(1) and CJRA Plan requirements in designing their discovery schedule. This is true even if the
Court ultimately excuses Rule 26(a)(1) compliance in whole or in part.
In sum, Rule 26 charges counsel with designing a discovery approach to their case which facilitates information exchange and dispute
resolution. Because of its inherent flexibility and pragmatic orientation,
the rule permits counsel to customize discovery and to fashion a program that will work best for their particular case, subject, of course, to
good faith attempts at full compliance with its provisions. In any case,
the Court will have the power to grant the parties' "opt-out" request as
long as they can demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction that the early
disclosure provisions are not appropriate for their case.
In stating this, however, the Advisory Group strongly cautions that
this opt-out feature is a limited one and should only attach after the
parties have convinced the Court, after good faith attempts at compliance, that early initial disclosures would only add cost and delay to the
discovery process and undermine the purposes of Rule 26. Thus, at the
very least, as a predicate to making this showing, the parties must hold a
Rule 26(f) conference, either in person or over the telephone, and
discuss, in the meaningful detail Rule 26(f) requires, the nature and basis
of their claims and defenses, the possibilities for a prompt settlement or
resolution of the case, and the proposed discovery plan. In addition, and
also at the very least, the parties must discuss the possibility of informally
exchanging, without written discovery requests, the information delineated in the four Rule 26(a)(1) categories. That discussion must include, to
the extent feasible, identifying what they need and why they need it.

44. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 33, at 629 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the Advisory Group recommends that Plan provision
number four be amended to reflect these recommendations and that the
Court's Rule 16(b) conference order and Sample Scheduling/Discovery
Plan be similarly revised. In particular:
1. the Court's Rule 16(b) scheduling/discovery order to counsel
should be revised (a) to expressly require the Rule 26(f) conference and
counsel's good faith, in-person (whether face-to-face or over the telephone) participation, (b) to expressly require compliance with Rule
26(a)(1) unless, in good faith, counsel agree, with particularized reasons
set out in the scheduling/discovery plan, that application of the mandatory discovery provisions of the rule is inappropriate in this particular case,
(c) to state that counsel are free to delineate any areas-including or
beyond those listed in Rule 26(a)(l)-for initial informal exchange, and
(d) to state, as part of the discovery plan, that counsel must delineate
which information will be exchanged informally and formally;
2. the Court's Sample Scheduling/Discovery Plan should be revised
to include a statement that the parties have, in good faith and in a live
in-person or telephonic exchange, discussed (a) the nature and basis of
their claims and defenses in reasonable detail sufficient to put counsel on
notice of the basic issues to be explored in discovery and of the key
information counsel seek in discovery and why, (b) the possibilities for a
prompt settlement or resolution of the case, (c) the proposed discovery
plan, and (d) the informal exchange, without written discovery requests,
of the information delineated in the four Rule 26(a)(1) categories,
especially what they need and why they need it, based on information
then reasonably available to them; and
3. the Court's Sample Scheduling/Discovery Plan should also be
revised to require counsel to define the extent of initial disclosures they
agreed to make and/or their reasons for failing to informally exchange
the information listed in Rule 26(a)(1). This explanation will serve as
the basis for the Court's assessment of good faith compliance so that the
reasons listed must demonstrate, to the Court's satisfaction, that early
disclosure has been completed to the extent feasible at this point in the
litigation, would only add cost and delay to the discovery process, or
would otherwise be unnecessary or unjust.
These changes, we hope, will assist the Bar in navigating Rule 26
(a)(1) and in capitalizing on the many benefits to be had under a discovery rule that bravely bucks a common presumption and perception that
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discovery must be a painful, costly, and time-consuming process.
Should this Court adopt these Rule 26 recommendations, the Advisory
Group will revisit them after the Court and counsel have more experience with them. In the meantime, the Group urges both cooperation and
creativity from the Bar concerning initial disclosure, and suggests that
those lawyers critical of these provisions give them a second look and a
second chance when next attempting compliance. Given its laudable
goals to promote justice while reducing cost and delay in the discovery
process, Rule 26(a)(1) deserves a full and fair "hearing" before final
condemnation. It is arguably our responsibility to give it one,45 even if
this requires a period of transition as the rough edges of early disclosure
are polished down by proper use of the rule.
5. Good Faith Certifications for Discovery Motions. The District's new Local Rule 16.1(B)(4), adopted January 23, 1995 at the
behest of the Court and Advisory Group, now expressly requires that
counsel actually confer in-person or by telephone (or other electronic
means) in order to resolve discovery disputes before requesting court
intervention. On the whole, there has been compliance with this rule and
the Court has observed an improved level of cooperation between
counsel. Accordingly, the Advisory Group recommends no changes to
this Plan provision.
6. Alternative Dispute Resolution. This is another area that the
original Advisory Group left open for re-examination as time and
experience unfolded. As we stated in the Report:
[T]he Advisory Group unanimously recommends the Court's encouragement of voluntary ADR between the parties, with a vocal minority of
the Group also favoring mandatory ADR at this time. Without foreclosing the possible adoption of an ADR requirement, the Advisory Group
recommends revisiting the question of whether ADR should be mandated
by the Court after the District has had a period of experience and experimentation with voluntary ADR.46

A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice .... As
a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. A lawyer should . . . help the bar regulate itself in the public
interest....
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, North Dakota Rules of ProfessionalConduct, N.D. CENT. CODE
COURT RuLEs ANN. 810-11 (1996-97).
46. Report, supra note 3, at 794.
45.
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And, as explained in the Advisory Group's First Annual Assessment:
This Court's decision to encourage participation in ADR has been
implemented by a new provision in the Scheduling/Discovery Plan
which asks counsel to confirm that they have "discussed between
themselves and explored with their clients early involvement in alternative dispute resolution." In addition, the Scheduling/Discovery Plan asks
counsel to indicate which, if any, ADR options would be appropriate for
the case and offers an ADR "menu" of options for counsel to consider.
The Scheduling/Discovery Plan further requires counsel to explain their
response if they indicate that no ADR option is appropriate. 4 7
From the data gathered by the Court, it is clear that counsel, in
overwhelming numbers, want some kind of early ADR and that the
court-hosted, "early" settlement conference is their ADR method of
choice.48 It appears that more parties are willing to participate in early
settlement conferences-and participate more seriously -because of the
Court's post-Plan earnestness about firm trial dates. As a general rule,
the Court permits the parties to decide what is "early," and this can be at
any time before the final pretrial conference.
This system is extremely successful. Anecdotally, the Court has
learned how court-hosted settlement conferences can contribute to both
the quantity and quality of settlements:
(1) While there is no way to calculate the number of settlements
that take place because of the Court, counsel have reported, with complimentary consistency, that the Court's involvement in the process has
played a central role in the timing, nature, and/or even the possibility of
settlement. A frequent refrain is that "this case might not have settled
without the Court's involvement." And because of that involvement, it
appears that a number of cases have accelerated settlements. The Court's
presence and prestige, and its provision of structured opportunities for
discussion, can bring the parties together earlier and more earnestly.
(2) At the very least, whether or not settlement discussions are successful, they often assist the parties in refining the issues for trial. This
invaluable incident of court-hosted settlement discussions supplements
47. FirstAnnual Assessment, supra note 6, at 903.
48. In most Class Two cases, the court-hosted, post-discovery settlement conference is mandatory, and usually takes place at or around the time of the final pretrial conference. The parties, however, who are free to engage in whatever other ADR method they wish, most often chose an early,
court-hosted conference in addition to, or instead of, the required post-discovery conference.
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the Court's other institutional attempts (such as the Intermediate Status
Conference) to narrow the issues and surface the significant ones in
order to streamline the trial.
(3) And, whether or not settlement results, clients report a marked
satisfaction with and through the court-hosted settlement process because
of the greater control they exert over presentation and discussion of their
claims or defenses. The informality of the settlement conference enables
clients to speak for themselves, to express their frustrations, and to literally "state their claims with particularity" directly to the Court. They
experience, first hand, a representative of the federal judiciary who takes
them seriously, listens to them with an official ear, and treats their
allegations with respect. For some, this translates into a rough equivalent
of "getting their day in court," which may ultimately help to encourage
settlement. If it does not, at least the clients have the satisfaction of
personal participation in the resolution process, which in the long run
may increase respect for the system or in the least improve understanding of its complexities.
The Advisory Group sees no reason, particularly in the absence of
contrary sentiment by the Court and counsel, to disrupt this process and
its benefits. Given what appears to be the Bench and Bar's continuing
preference for a voluntary ADR program and their consistent utilization
of the current procedure to great effect, the Advisory Group recommends that the system remain as is for the time being.
7. Extensive Utilization of the Magistrate Judge. Now that the
District has had more experience under the Plan and with its central
commitment to early and firm trial dates, the Advisory Group can more
accurately determine the effect on the magistrate judges' consent
docket. One thing is very clear: Most consents to trial before the
Magistrate Judges are taking place earlier than ever before-usually at
the initial Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference (where the firm trial dates
are now set) instead of at the final pretrial conference. While the assigned district judge reserves the right to override these consents, they
are usually approved.
Early consents mean that the magistrate judges are trying more
cases and deciding more dispositive motions, while the district judges are
handling more settlement conferences. This partial "role reversal" has
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several benefits for all of the judges as well as for the federal bar practicing before them. First, the district judges bring their vast and wellrespected trial experience to the settlement process. Similarly, the magistrate judges bring their well-respected settlement experience to the trial
process. This cross-fertilization of talent and broadened range of
experience work to accentuate the many strengths of our Federal bench
as a whole. It also promotes versatility. Moreover, the magistrate judges'
growing trial and dispositive motion experience will add to their credibility as settlement mediators as well as to their quotient of professional
satisfaction.
The Advisory Group is again very pleased with the Court's utilization of the magistrate judges for trials and settlement efforts as well as
with pretrial management. Accordingly, the Advisory Group recommends no changes to this Plan provision which encourages extensive
utilization of the magistrate judges as an integral and essential part of the
District's judicial life.
8. Need for Second Full-Time Magistrate Judge. In its original
Report and First Annual Assessment, the Advisory Group strongly urged
that this District secure a second full-time magistrate chambered in
Bismarck, even with the intervening appointment of half-time Magistrate
Judge Dwight Kautzmann.49 Accordingly, the Group was very pleased
to learn that this half-time position has been up-graded to a full-time
position starting October 1, 1996 and expresses its deep appreciation to
the Magistrate Judges Committee of the Judicial Conference and the
Judicial Conference itself for a decision that will ultimately result in
more timely and cost-efficient civil dispositions for this District, particularly in the western divisions.
9. Division Boundaries. In accordance with the Plan, the issue of
division boundary realignment has been referred to the District's Federal
Practice Committee. The Advisory Group still supports this referral and
recommends no changes to this Plan provision.
10. Resources for the Judiciary. Particularly in light of our
inability to meet on a more consistent basis because of diminished and
interrupted congressional funding, the Advisory Group reaffirms the

49. Report, supranote 3, at 797-99; FirstAnnual Assessment, supranote 6. at 903.
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resources statement it recommended to the Court, which adopted it as
part of the original Plan:
The Court recommends that Congress provide the federal courts with
immediate funding sufficient for the federal Judiciary to carry out the
CJRA expense and delay reduction plans specifically designed to ensure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes. In addition, because Congress and the Executive Branch must be accountable
for possible case management consequences on both the federal and state
court systems of their decisions concerning substantive rights and jurisdictional allocations, an assessment of their impact upon the processingcapacity of the federal trial courts should follow and with it, any funding
necessary to ensure that processing problems do not impede the vindica50
tion of rights or the forum access Congress intended to provide.
Thus, at the very least, we encourage Congress to provide the funding for
this Group to complete its tasks as requested. Moreover, given the
growing importance of science and technology in the courtroom, the
Advisory Group supports congressional funding for restricted, but
nonetheless possible, use of court-appointed experts in those cases where
the Court cannot depend upon the resources of the parties to provide the
expertise needed for a just adjudication. Otherwise, the Advisory Group
recommends no other changes to this Plan provision.
11. Taxation of Costs. The new taxation procedures originally
recommended by the Advisory Group, subsequently adopted by the
Court, and ultimately incorporated in new Local Rule 54.1(A)-(B)
are,from all accounts, working well and the Advisory Group recommends no changes to this Plan provision.

III. CONCLUSION
At the end of the Plan's first year, the Advisory Group "look[ed]
forward to a second year of even greater progress in eliminating the
enemies of inordinate cost and delay as the Plan matures in its beneficial
effects." 5 ' Now, with two and one half year's worth of experience
behind it, the Advisory Group concludes that the Plan has played a
crucial role in improving the District's capacity to process its civil case
calendar. Its central theory, that firm trial dates set early in the pretrial
process can have a profound and positive effect on getting cases to trial
50. Plan, supra note 4, at 868. See also Report, supra note 3, at 800-02 (amplifying this Plan
provision).
51. FirstAnnual Assessment, supra note 6, at 904.
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in a timely and cost-efficient manner, has thus far proven to be true.
The challenge is not only to maintain the gains made, but to improve
upon them, more and more.
The Advisory Group is hopeful that a fresh look at, and proper use
of, Rule 26's informal disclosure provisions will add even greater
efficiencies to the discovery process without sacrificing fairness along
the way. It is our collective responsibility as professionals and public
servants to give the new rule-which our Court has adopted-a fair
chance before rejecting it. Revisiting the Rule 26(f) conference, as we
suggest, may help extend the efficiencies of our current pretrial conference sequence-the Rule 16(b), intermediate, final, and settlement
conferences-back one step in the pretrial chain. This could have
tremendous benefits for all counsel, and ultimately, for all clients. We
ask the assistance of the Bench and particularly the Bar in making this
possible, and respectfully request open-minded reconsideration of Rule
26's informal disclosure provisions, which do not have to complicate,
prolong, or undermine the adversary process if good faith and case-tocase flexibility are the guides for maximizing its intended benefits. The
CJRA, which holds each of us responsible for making justice more
affordable and therefore more attainable, requires no less.

Respectfully Submitted,
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

